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THE INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE:
PROS AND CONS OF MINERAL DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY
I. Introduction 
A. Summary.
Any major mineral development project, wherever 
located, is a long-term, complex, difficult and risky business 
proposition. Moving such a project forward always requires 
solutions to numerous legal and technical problems involved in 
acquiring the rights to prospect for the minerals, in structuring 
the transaction and acquiring extraction rights from the mineral 
resources owner, in financing the project, obtaining 
environmental permits, solving marketing and transportation 
problems and entering into sales contracts, and in producing the 
minerals for market.
In the author's professional experience, developed from 
the perspective of representing a lessee of coal from the Crow 
Tribe of Indians since the early 1970's, an additional level of 
complexity is added to almost every step of the process when the 
minerals to be developed are owned in trust for an Indian Tribe. 
This additional complexity can cause delays, uncertainty and 
competitive disadvantages to the project.
This outline sets out a very selective and brief 
chronology of significant events occurring during the development
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and operation of the Westmoreland Resources, Inc. ("WRI") 
Absaloka Coal mine on the ceded strip adjoining the Crow 
Reservation. It next identifies some of the significant legal 
and practical issues for WRI's relationship with the Crow Tribe 
arising from those events. It then suggests that, from the 
Industry perspective, many of the legal issues relating to the 
development of Indian mineral resources which will have been 
discussed by the preceding speakers can make development of
i 1
Indian-owned minerals seems to be significantly more uncertain 
and risky than developing competing state, federal or fee 
reserves.
B. General Background.
During the early 1970's, the members of the Western 
coal mining industry were affected by numerous major legal and 
public policy disputes. These involved environmental impact 
statement disclosures on coal leasing and development, land 
management and planning issues and implementation of various 
aspects of the Clean Air Act, the Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act and the Clean Water Act. (See, e.q.. Kleppe v. 
Sierra Club; 427 U.S. 390, 49 L.Ed. 2d 576, 96 S.Ct. 2718 (1976); 
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Hughes. 454 F. Sujpp. 148 
(D.D.C. 1978).)
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The WRI Absaloka mine also had many of these same types 
of general environmental issues to litigate. (See, e.g.. Cady v. 
Morton, 527 F .2d 786 (9th Cir., 1975). In addition, WRI had to 
deal with many other legal and practical issues arising out of 
the Indian-owned status of the coal it had leased.
II• Chronology of an Indian Lands Mineral Development
A. Chronology of Significant Events.
As indicated in the "events" chronology below, WRI 
became involved in significant litigation and Interior Department 
proceedings involving various aspects of the Interior 
Department's trust responsibility, the Crow Ceded Strip's legal 
status, the taxing powers of Montana and of the Crow Tribe, the 
regulation of surface mining and other legal and economic issues.
1. On October 20, 1970, in a competitive sale
conducted by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA),
WRI was the successful bidder for two Mineral 
Prospecting Permits (Tracts 2 and 3) in Big Horn 
Country, Montana on the so-called "Ceded STrip" 
immediately to the North of the Crow Reservation.
The permits gave WRI the right to prospect for and 
obtain leases on specific terms and conditions
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from the Crow Tribe of Indians for the coal 
underlying Tract 2 and Tract 3.
2. On June 6, 1972, WRI converted the two Prospecting 
Permits it obtained in 1970 into coal leases. The 
leases were approved by the BIA. The leases provided 
for a $0,175 per ton royalty to the Tribe, an annual 
lease rental of $1.00 per acre and an annual minimum 
royalty of $2.00 per acre for the first four years and 
thereafter a minimum annual royalty of $5.00 per acre. 
The term of the leases was for 10 years and so long 
thereafter as coal is produced in paying quantities.
The leases also had a unitization provision that 
allowed the production in paying quantities from one 
Tract to satisfy the paying quantities provision of the 
other Tract.
3. On June 15, 1972, WRI signed identical contracts with 
four utilities providing for the sale of an aggregate 
4.0 million tons of coal per year for 20 years 
beginning in 1974. The tonnage for 1974 was to be 
prorated based on the start-up date of the mine. The 
contracts passed royalty and tax costs through to the 
customers.
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4. After acquiring the Crow Tribe leases and signing the 
long term contracts with the four utilities, WRI began 
developing the Tract 3 lease by proceeding to construct 
a 38 mile rail spur, erecting a 75 cubic yard dragline, 
applying for mine permits, and constructing the plant 
facilities necessary to ship the contract tonnage.
WRI' s investment in plant and equipment quickly 
approached $70 million. During this process, WRI 
became involved in national scale (Kleppe. supra) and 
"site specific" (Cady, supra) litigation regarding the 
Interior Department's compliance with NEPA on western 
coal development and coal mine permitting.
5. At about the same time as the mine was being built, the 
Arab oil embargo and the "energy crisis" led to a 
rapid increase in oil prices and to a rush to obtain 
and develop Western coal. This, in turn, led to a 
demand from the Tribe that the 1972 coal leases be 
renegotiated. WRI reached several agreements on 
renegotiated lease terms with the Crow Tribe's mineral 
committee, but none were approved by the Tribal 
Council. During this apparent impasse, on July 1,
6
1974, WRI shipped the first unit train of coal from 
Tract 3 to Northern States Power.
6. On July 13, 1974, the Crow Tribe, acting through the 
Crow Tribal Council, adopted a resolution declaring the 
Coal Mining Leases for Tracts 2 and 3 invalid and 
directing that action be taken with the Secretary of 
the Interior or otherwise to establish such invalidity. 
On July 31, 1974, the Crow Tribe filed a Petition with 
the Secretary of the Interior asking that the leases be 
declared invalid or modified. The grounds asserted 
were that the leases did not conform in all respects to 
the BIA coal leasing regulations, and that the BIA had 
inadequately protected the Tribe's interests, in breach 
of its trust responsibilities and its fiduciary duties.
7. WRI opposed the Tribe's petition before the Secretary, 
and no action to cancel the leases was taken pending 
efforts to settle. Following extensive negotiations in 
Washington, D.C., representatives of the Crow Tribe and 
Westmoreland reached an agreement settling and 
compromising all their disputes and differences, which 
was then approved by the Tribal Council. The 
settlement was represented by two Amended Coal Mining
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Leases, a Land Purchase Agreement and a Settlement 
Agreement, all approved by the Secretary of the 
Interior. The Amended Coal Mining leases provided for 
a sliding scale percentage royalty rising to six 
percent in place of the $0,175 per ton royalty in the 
original leases. At the time the leases were signed, 
this was the highest percentage royalty in effect in 
the West. It was subject to renegotiation after 10 
years on a portion of the coal under lease.
8. In April, 1975, the Montana Legislature passed a bill 
increasing the Montana Coal Severance tax from $0.34 
per ton to 30% of the Contract Value. It also created 
a new Gross Proceeds tax, applied to 45% of the gross 
proceeds of coal mining at the county mill levy. For 
the Severance tax, Contract Value was defined as the 
F.O.B. mine price less taxes based on production or 
value. Taxes based on production or value can also be 
deducted before determining the Gross Proceeds from 
mining. The midwestern utilities who had contracted to 
buy Montana coal, including WRI's customers, brought a 
suit in Montana State Court to challenge the 
constitutionality of these taxes. They were ultimately
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unsuccessful in avoiding and in limiting these Montana 
taxes, both in the Supreme Court and in Congress.
9. The Crow Tribe passed its own severance tax in 1976. 
The tax rate was 25% of the F.O.B. mine price, with no 
deductions. This tax was approved for the Crow 
Reservation proper (where no coal mining was being 
conducted) in 1977, but was not approved by the 
Secretary for the Ceded Strip because of a disclaimer 
of jurisdiction in the Crow Tribe's constitution.
10. In 1976, the minimum royalty for new leases of surface 
mined federal coal was set by Congress at 12.5 percent 
of the F.O.B. mine price.
11. Congress passed the Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act in 1977. Section 710 of the Act,
30 U.S.C. §1300, provided for a study of the 
question of coal mine regulation on "Indian /
Lands", defined by the Act to include all lands 
owned in trust for a Tribe. Section 1300 (h) 
directed the Secretary to analyze the 
jurisdictional status of such lands outside of 
Indian Reservations. Also under the Act, a
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Federal Reclamation Fee of $0.35 per ton became 
effective on October 1, 1977. This fee goes to 
reclaim abandoned mines, coal and otherwise, and 
for the administration of the Act, but does not go 
to reclaim land currently being mined. The mine 
operator pays for current and future reclamation 
costs.
12. A Federal Black Lung tax became effective on April 1, 
1978. The tax was 2% of the F.O.B. mine price or $0.25 
whichever was less. This tax is to cover past claims 
for Black Lung benefits. WRI and its mining contractor 
pay for future claims through private insurance.
13. In 1978, the Crow Tribe brought suit in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Montana against the 
State of Montana, and Big Horn and Treasure Counties, 
seeking to invalidate the Montana Severance and Gross 
Proceeds taxes as unconstitutional. WRI interevened as 
a defendant, seeking judgments that neither the Tribe 
nor Montana could tax its mining operation. After ten 
years, this litigation is entering its third phase.
The Tribe has prevailed against the State, but WRI1s 
utility customers are now seeking to intervene to
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challenge the Tribe's right to obtain tax monies which 
they have paid WRI in the past, including the 
approximately $28 which WRI has paid into Court. Crow 
Tribe of Indians v. State of Montana (Crow I), 650 
F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, den. 459 U.S. 916 
(1982), (reversing 469 F. Supp. 154) (D. Mont. 1979).
Crow Tribe of Indians v. State of Montana (Crow II),
657 F. Supp. 573 (D. Mont. 1985), reversed, 819 F.2d
895 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd ___ U.S. ____ (1988).
Because this case is very much in active litigation at 
the time this outline is being prepared, I will not 
further characterize the positions of the parties.
B. An Overlay Chronology of Issues.
The "Events Chronlogy" set out above carries with it a 
"practical and legal issues" chronology which has developed 
during the same 18-year period. The issues which are significant 
for purposes of the present discussion are as follows:
1. Who speaks for (and can bind) the Crow Tribe in 
business negotiations?
2. Is an agreement with the Crow Tribe, which the 
Secretary has approved, going to be enforceable in 
accordance with its terms? How?
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3. What is the geographical extent of the governmental 
powers of the Crow Tribe?
4. What is the precise legal status of the Ceded Strip?
5. To what extent can Montana regulate the Mining of Crow 
Tribe coal under SMCRA?
6. To what extent can the Crow Tribe regulate the mining 
of Crow Tribe coal under SMCRA?
7. How much duplication in surface mining regulation can 
the WRI mine withstand?
8. How much duplication in taxation can the WRI mine 
withstand?
9. What approach will the Crow Tribe take in exercising 
its newly-recognized taxing powers in competition with 
other governments.
10. To what extent can WRI's customers, who have taken as 
little Crow Tribe coal as their contracts permit, be
12
persuaded to increase their purchase commitments based 
on Tribal decisions?
Ill. Indian Mineral Resource Development Issues from 
an Industry Lawyer's Perspective
A. The General Point of View of Industry.
In relating "pros and cons" of dealing with Tribes on 
natural resource matters, I can only speak for myself, and 
indicate the concerns which I have heard my clients and others in 
industry express. In a very general way, the events and the 
issues set out above have instituted the following present 
viewpoints.
1. As a lawyer for a number of natural resources 
developers, I tend to have a perspective on the legal 
issues being discussed at this conference which is 
different from lawyers responsible for representing 
Tribal governments. It is not a negative perspective, 
but it recognizes previous difficulties my clients have 
encountered, and insists that new arrangements avoid 
them.
2. I recognize and respect the desires of Indian Tribes 
to play more direct and significant roles in the
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development of their natural resources. However, these 
desires raise legal issues which do not have to be 
dealt with when developing federal or state-owned 
minerals, and which many clients may wish to avoid 
because their tolerance for uncertainty is low.
B. Regulatory Issues.
1. My clients do not generally see any particular 
advantage to them in dealing with yet another sovereign 
on what are already complex regulatory issues.
2. They think the only guaranteed outcome of a dispute 
over who has power to regulate them is uncertainty and 
duplication, neither of which are good for their 
business.
3. If they believe that economic self-interest will lead 
their Tribal regulators to permit mining techniques or 
other environmental protection measures any less 
stringent than the structure of the federal or state 
requirements, I believe they will be in for a rude 
awakening.
a. The coal mining laws don't appear to contemplate
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any such relaxation of performance standards in 
Indian Lands Regulatory Programs,
b. Any easier regulatory regime for Indian-regulated 
mining operations would be difficult to justify 
environmentally or politically, either within the 
Tribe or outside of it.
4. Stricter environmental regulation is likely to generate 
competitive difficulties.
C. Economic Issues.
1. Clients are likely to fear that the Interior Department 
will see to it that the economic terms one agrees to 
with an Indian Tribe will be upset if the market turns 
against the Tribe, but will be immutable if the market 
turns against them.
a. Crow Tribe royalty rates were readjusted upward 
under Interior Department pressure when coal was 
in short supply.
b. 10 years later in a soft market, the Department 
refused to approve new royalties on a portion of 
the Tribe's coal at less than the federal rates.
15
2. Clients are likely to fear that they will generally be 
expected to defer to a Tribe's economic needs:
a. In usual business negotiations, neither of the 
parties generally is expected to act against its 
own self-interest in order to provide benefits to 
the other.
b. There is a tendency for this convention not to be 
accepted by Indian Tribes and those who represent 
them.
c. Whatever terms are agreed to, they will not be 
seen as sufficiently protective of Tribal 
interests by future evaluators.
3. Tribes tend to want to be involved in setting the 
economic terms of specific transactions.
4. Clients tend to want fixed royalty and tax rates, and 
freedom to market on their own with no need to consult 
with a Tribe on terms and conditions.
IV. Conclusion
A minerals industry member is likely to look at 
natural resources development opportunities in some overall 
context, i.e.. realizing that in today's markets it can choose
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among competing resource owners with whom to deal. Indian Tribes 
and those advising them must consider carefully how to approach 
industry member reluctance to deal with unusual, uncertain and 
complex arrangements, and prepare to deal constructively with the 
business and legal issues industry members, and their customers, 
will be concerned with.
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